"The "secuirty" part of VSTO security is that end-user has to make explicit decision to trust the code."
Once we establish that all the "security" model really does is require the user to install applications, then what purpose is served by making it any harder than necessary to package installable applications?
Surely you're not about to argue that the increased difficulty of building installable applications helps to deter hackers...?
"Security is not the right choice for "It just works" approach."
True, but security should also be more than just requiring the end-user to install the program. Frankly, it's an insult that I have to subscribe to CAS and carefully key my entire deployment when the truth is that any hacker can do all the same things, and that in the end the only thing that makes us secure is our reliance on the user to only install "good" programs. Make no mistake: this model may protect Microsoft, but from where I stand it's mostly just programming overhead. Show me a model where my software will work but the malware won't, and maybe it'll be worth the effort.
I appreciate the logging tips. I will be sure to try it the next time I'm having problems with an installer. Are you saying it will actually tell me which component/strong name key is the problem? |